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CLARIFYING THE LAW RELATING TO UNMANNED DRONES AND THE
USE OF FORCE: THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS,
SELF-DEFENSE, ARMED CONFLICT, AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
Molly McNab and Megan Matthews*

1.

INTRODUCTION

By now it is common knowledge that the United States employs weaponized
unmanned drones in its conflict with al Qaeda. Predator drones, equipped with
Hellfire Missiles, were first deployed shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks to target al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan.' The first reported drone strike
outside Afghanistan occurred in 2002 in Yemen. 2 The basic facts of the United
States' conflict with al Qaeda are relatively well known. However, the law that
governs the conflict is murky at best, and there is little consensus among the legal
experts on many relevant legal issues. This article is designed to lay out the basic
framework of the law and highlight the major areas of contention, providing the
foundation for understanding the intricacies and nuances discussed by the eminent
publicists writing in this edition of the Denver Journal of International Law &
Policy.
To explain the laws governing the use of force, applied in a modern context,
this article first briefly describes in Section 1I the historical context in which the
law surrounding the use of force developed. Then, Section III explains the basic
legal paradigms that apply to an analysis concerning the legality of drones as
weapons of war, including human rights, self-defense, the law of armed conflict,
and international humanitarian law (IHL). A brief examination of terrorism and
the background history relating to difficulties in defining terrorism follows in
Section IV. Section V examines the different approaches to the jus ad bellum
analysis, which is the first step in determining legality of the use of force. Finally,

* Both authors graduated from the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law in May 2011
with J.D.s and Certificates in International Law. Additionally, both authors were members of the
Jessup International Moot Court Team. They would like to thank Professor David Akerson for his
dedication to research on the use of force law and for his invaluable assistance during the research and
writing process. The authors would also like to thank Anjali Nanda, John Gaudette, and Megan
Moriarty for their immense contributions.
1. Douglas Waller, How the CIA Fights its New War, TIME, Nov. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,183002,00.html.
2. U.S. Missile Strike Kills al Qaeda Chief, YEMEN TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, available at
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-11-05/world/yemen.blast-lsuccessful-tactical-operation-internationalkillers-marib? s=PM:WORLD.
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Section VI lays out the jus in bello assessment that governs how a State may use
force when carrying out a specific campaign.
II.

BACKGROUND

In the mid-1600's, Hugo Grotius, the Dutch scholar widely considered the
father of international law,3 recognized the paramount principle of territorial
sovereignty, and that all sovereigns are perpetually either in a state of peace
governed by human rights law or a state of war governed by humanitarian law.4
These revelations were considered to be new concepts of international law
designed to reflect new legal realities. 5 Such a paradigm shift is now termed a
"Grotian Moment." 6 Some scholars argue that September 11 th created a Grotian
Moment regarding the use of force to combat terrorism,7 while others argue the
traditional bipartite legal paradigm of humanitarian law and human rights law
ensconced by Grotius' original Grotian Moment prevails 8 and the fundamental
principle of territorial sovereignty 9 remains inviolable.10
3. Milena Sterio, A Grotian Moment: Changes in the Legal Theory of Statehood, 39 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 209, 211 (2011).
4. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (A.C. Campbell trans., London, 1814)
(1625); L. Ali Khan, The Extinction of Nation States, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 197, 197 (1992).
5. John W. Head, Throwing Eggs at Windows: Legal and Institutional Globalization in the 21stCentury Economy, 50 KAN. L. REV. 731, 771 (2002).
6. Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the "Grotian Moment": Accelerated Formation of Customary
InternationalLaw in Times of FundamentalChange, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 439, 443-44 (2010).
7. E.g., Ian Johnstone, The Plea of "Necessity" in InternationalLegal Discourse: Humanitarian
Intervention and Counter-Terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 370 (2005) (arguing that a
"constitutional moment" occurred in the aftermath of September 1 1th, which is the same concept
embodied by the term "Grotian Moment"); Benjamin Langille, It's "Instant Custom ': How the Bush
Doctrine Became Law After the TerroristAttacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 145 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional
Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2002).
79, 80, 85, U.N. GAOR, 60th
8. See, e.g., 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1,
Sess., 8th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/I (Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://daccess-dds(reaffirming that the
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdfOpenElement
traditional restrictions on the use of force prescribed by the U.N. Charter remains the legal framework
under which States must operate in combating terrorism) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome];
The Secretary-General, Note by the Secretary-General,Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium
Summit,
189-92, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf (rejecting a new writing or re-interpretation of Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter which lays out the requirements for self-defense) [hereinafter Note by SecretaryGeneral, Millennium Summit]; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 745 (7th
ed. 2008); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, State Sponsors of Terrorism: Issues of InternationalResponsibility, in
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 3, 13 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004);
Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Redefining Sovereignty Via International Constitutional Moments?. The
Case of Afghanistan, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 335,
362-63 (Michael Bothe, Mary Ellen O'Connell & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 2005) (arguing that Anneth
Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White's contention that September 11 constituted a
"constitutional moment" and, accordingly, a valid legal norm, is unsupportable and instead,
"constitutional moments" merely reflect norm projections).
9. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131,
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Regardless of whether September 11 th constituted a Grotian Moment, the
challenge the international community faces today is applying law, which
developed over the course of the last four centuries, to new situations and
While international law
technologies that were previously unimaginable.
continuously evolves, arguing that September 11 th caused total destruction to the
foundational principles governing the use of force is unsupportable. Rather, use of
force law may have evolved in some manners, but it did so within the confines of
well-established basic principles.
Since Grotius, significant evolution of the foundational concept of war and
peace has occurred. Two of the most momentous developments emerged from the
rubble of World War II. First, the United Nations (U.N.) was formed, and now,
virtually all States are party to the U.N. Charter.11 Accordingly, Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter, which codifies a general prohibition on the use of force, is binding
upon nearly every State.1 2 This prohibition can only be overcome in very narrow
exceptions, one of which is a 3State's inherent right to self-defense, laid out in
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
The second post-World War II development was the introduction, and
subsequent adoption, of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides for the
protection of civilians during armed conflicts. 14 The Additional Protocols of 1977
to the Geneva Conventions supplemented these essential civilian protections.
Additional Protocol I provides greater security for civilians,' 5 and Additional
Protocol II further elucidates the requirements for States engaging in1 6conflicts
against non-State actors, such as al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations.
Following the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, there have
been significant changes in both the parties to war and the methods of warfare.
The World Wars involved great sovereign powers marching on a foreign sovereign
territory, but now the "enemy" often involves non-State actors possessing no
U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1408th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/20/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965); Declaration on
Principles in International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), pmbl., U.N. GAOR 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 18, Annex (Oct. 24, 1970) [Declaration on Friendly Relations].
10. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of
InternationalLaw, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 997 (2001); Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition,
Torture, and OtherNightmaresfrom the War on Terror, 75 GEO WASH. L. REv. 1201, 1225 (2007).
11. U.N., Member States, http://www.un.org/en/members/ (last visited April 9, 2011).
12. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
13. U.N. Charter art. 51. The other exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force are discussed
briefly in Section III.
14. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol 1].
16. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
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territory, no formal military, and no official constituency. Similarly, military
technology has developed greatly. In traditional warfare, tanks, planes, and wellorganized battalions marched across enemy territory. Today, the means and
methods of warfare are imbalanced between the parties. Non-State actors employ
rudimentary technology that allows a single combatant to carry out an entire attack
with a road-side improvised explosive device or suicide vest. 17 Meanwhile,
developed nations use state-of-the-art unmanned drones with laser guided missiles
to target military objectives located thousands of miles away from the drone
operator. 18 Due to these evolutions, international law has been stretched, adapted,
and sometimes contorted to fit a mode of combat unimaginable to the drafters of
the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Conventions in the aftermath of World War II.
III.

THE BASIC LEGAL PARADIGMS

The general prohibition on the use of force is codified in U.N. Charter Article
2(4), and is also well established customary international law.' 9 Customary
international law is universally binding and formed by widespread and consistent
state practice coupled with opinio juris, a State's belief that it has a legal
obligation. 21 The prohibition on the use of force is so engrained in customary
international law and viewed by the international community as an inherent
obligation of all States that it is considered ajus cogens norm, or peremptory norm
from which no derogation is permitted.22
There are several limited exceptions to this prohibition. The first is a State's
inherent right to use force in self-defense, either individually or collectively. 23 The
second exception is for use of force upon Security Council authorization for the
purposes of maintaining international peace and security. 24 Such Security Council

17. Alissa J. Rubin, In Kandahar, Another Suicide Bomber Kills 2, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2011,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/08/world/asia/08afghanistan.html?ref =
improvisedexplosive devices; Thorn Shanker, Makeshift Bombs Spread Beyond Afghanistan, Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES,

Oct.

18,

2009,

available

at

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/world/29military

.html?ref-improvisedexplosivedevices.
18. See Aaron Drake, Current U.S. Air Force Drone Operations and Their Conduct in
Compliance with InternationalHumanitarianLaw - An Overview, 39 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 629,

630-32, 636-38 (2011). In discussing the unmanned vehicles employed by the U.S., Israel, and other
States and their legal implications, this article will refer exclusively to the terms drone or unmanned
drone. A variety of other terms are utilized to describe these vehicles, including: remotely piloted
aircraft (RPA), "'armed drone', unmanned (or uninhabited) aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned (or
uninhabited) aircraft system (UAS)" and a handful of other technical names. Ian Henderson,
InternationalLaw Concerningthe Status and Marking of Remotely PilotedAircraft, 39 DENY. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 615, 615 (2011).
19. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 267 (1963);
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 64-65 (2d. ed. 2005).

20. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./De., F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 171 (Feb. 20).
21. Id. T 77.
22. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 510-12.
23. U.N. Charter art. 51; Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 176 (June 26).
24. U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51.
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25
authorization was recently given in order to protect civilian populations in Libya.
Finally, regional enforcement actions are permitted under Article 53 of the U.N.
Charter, but the legality of such action is also predicated upon Security Council
authorization.26

The law governing the use of force is split into two parts: jus ad bellum
dictates the conditions under which a State may resort to the use of force,27 andjus
in bello controls the means and methods of force a State may legally employ. 28
The former determines the right to use of force and the latter regulates how that
right is executed.
Within thejus ad bellum analysis, there are three possible legal paradigms in
which a State may be acting. First, during times of peace, States are governed by
human rights law and may only use law enforcement methods to ensure security.29
Second, a State acting within the self-defense paradigm, under which a State
confronted with violence or threatened with imminent violence, may, under U.N.
Charter Article 51 and customary international law, 30 use force in self-defense so
long as it is necessary and proportionate. 31 Finally, a State may use force within
the context of an armed conflict, under the parameters of international
humanitarian law. 32 If the State is not operating within the self-defense or armed
conflict paradigms, it must be operating in the human rights paradigm. Simply put,
if a State does not meet the legal criteria of self-defense or armed conflict, but uses
force without Security Council authorization, it is doing so unlawfully. Thus, it
becomes imperative for a State utilizing military force to justify and legitimize its
actions as either a lawful right to self-defense or engagement in an armed conflict.
Once a State finds itself in one of the two categories that permits the use of
force, it must comply with jus in bello principles that govern how that force is
used.33 The primary source forjus in bello principles are the Geneva Conventions
and the Additional Protocols, but virtually every principle codified in the
Conventions are universally accepted as customary international law as well.34

25. Libya. Ban Welcomes Security Council Authorization of Measures to Protect Civilians, U.N.
2011),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37809&
CENTRE
(Mar.
18,
NEWS
Cr=libya&Cr1.
26. U.N. Charter art. 53.
27. MYRES McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR, 132-33

(1994).
28. Marco Sass6li, Ius ad Bellum and Jus in Bello-The SeparationBetween the Legality of the Use
of Force and Humanitarian Rules to be Respected in Watfare: Crucial or Outdated?, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 242 (2007).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra, Section V(A).
See infra, Section V(B).
See infra, Section V(B)(iv).
See infra, Section V(C).
See infra Section VI.

34. ICRC, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, INTRODUCTION (2001), available

at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl

cha in in [hereinafter ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL].
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THE RELEVANCE OF DEFINING TERRORISM

Combating terrorism is one of the primary purposes for the employment of
armed drones by States such as Russia, Israel, and the United States.35 The use of
military action to respond to terrorism is controversial. To fully understand the
debate, it is necessary to understand the essential elements of terrorism in order to
properly place it as a cog within the legal clockwork relating to the use of force
and drones. An ad hoc approach by States in addressing terrorism has developed
due to the failure of the international community to either adopt a unified
definition of terrorism or to create a binding instrument relating to the prevention
or punishment of terrorism in all contexts.
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and States began making concerted
efforts to create a legal framework for addressing terrorism well before the creation
of the United Nations. 36 States notably began to address the topic of terrorism in a
unified effort beginning with the League of Nations and the 1937 Convention for
the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. 37 States involved in the drafting
were unable to reach consensus on the definition of terrorism and the instrument

was abandoned.38
Since then, States have struggled to agree upon a comprehensive definition of
terrorism. 39 After the 1972 Munich Olympics, where the terrorist group, Black
September, massacred eleven Israeli athletes, the United Nations stepped into the
international efforts to find a unified definition. 40 That same year, the United
States proposed a Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain
Acts of International Terrorism. 41 This draft focused on defining terrorism as
violence by non-State actors against a State, without any exception for legitimate

35. See P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS EVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 263-78 (2009); Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6
14, 18-24 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Alston Report]; Mary
Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan 2004-2009 (Notre
Dame Law School, Legal Series Research Paper No. 09-43, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1501144;
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRECISELY
WRONG: GAZA CIVILIANS KILLED BY ISRAELI DRONE-LAUNCHED MISSILES 3 (2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/06/30/precisely-wrong-0.
36. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Terrorism and Human Rights,
6-7,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/27 (June 7, 1999) (by Kalliopi K. Koufa, Special Rapporteur)
[hereinafter Koufa, Terrorism and Human Rights].
37. Id. 6; HELEN DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 18-19 (2005).
38. Koufa, Terrorism andHumanRights, supra note 36,
6; DUFFY, supra note 37, at 18-19.
39. Koufa, Terrorism andHuman Rights, supra note 36,
7; TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE
STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 84-85 (2006); DUFFY, supra note 37, at 1819.
40. BECKER, supra note 39, at 89; BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 198
(2008); 11 Israelis,4 Arabs, German Die in Munich Olympics Terrorism, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 6,
1972, at 1.
41. SAUL, supra note 40, at 198.
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struggles of self-determination.42 Because this proposed instrument arrived during
an era of political upheaval in developing States attempting to cast off the chains of
colonialism, the draft was not adopted and vehement disputes ensued between
terrorism. 43
developed and developing States concerning an accurate definition of
In place of a united approach, States attacked the task of addressing terrorism in a
"sectoral" method 44 by drafting and adopting conventions to combat terrorism for
very specific situations, such as an airplane hijacking or extortion.45
After the tragic events of September 11 th, the United Nations reignited its
efforts in creating an inclusive and acceptable definition of terrorism, as well as
adopting an instrument to condemn and punish acts of terrorism. 46 A string of
Security Council Resolutions were issued which simultaneously condemned acts
of terrorism, urged States to aid in international efforts to combat terrorism, and
reminded States that aiding terrorists constituted a breach of their international
obligations. 47 In an effort to steer clear of the controversy over terrorism's
definition, the Security Council failed to issue a definition within these
Unfortunately, to date, the feasibility of "a global terrorism
resolutions.48
convention [and] its precise content or scope . . . remain shrouded in
uncertainty. 49
Ultimately, a fairly universal definition of terrorism has evolved from the
elements littered in multiple conventions. Jurists and scholars generally agree that
terrorism is defined, at the least, by three essential elements: 1) an act of violence
that causes death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants (or
threatens such violence, such as the taking of hostages); 2) for the purpose of
causing terror or intimidation; and 3) to compel a government or organization to do

42. BECKER, supra note 39, at 90.
43. BECKER, supra note 39, at 90-91; SAUL, supra note 40, at 199.
44. BECKER, supra note 39, at 92.
45. E.g., Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963,
20 U.ST. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, entered intoforce Jan. 26, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 178;
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
entered into force Feb. 20, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention to Prevent and
Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that
are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, OAS T.S., No. 37; International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Marine Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S.
221; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S.
256; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178
U.N.T.S. 197.
46. DUFFY,supra note 37, at 20-21; BECKER, supra note 39, at 100-01.
47. S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doe. S/RES 1378 (Nov. 14, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001);; S.C. Res. 1566,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004).
48. BECKER, supra note 39, at 101.
49. DUFFY, supra note 37, at 23.
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or abstain from doing an act. 50 This basic definition, however, does not
definitively specify whether terrorism is considered an organized crime (putting it
within the human rights paradigm) or if the law of self-defense or armed conflict
can also govern, and thereby fails to provide sufficient guidance for States
attempting to combat terrorists.
Because no comprehensive treaty law exists and no customary lex specialis
has developed relating to terrorism, States are left to address terrorism within the
binding corpus of existing treaty and customary international law. The debate
continues to rage over whether terrorism falls under the purview of human rights
law or under the self-defense and armed conflict paradigms.
V.

ANALYZING JUS AD BELLUM

This section will walk through each of the jus ad bellum paradigms. There is
significant disagreement in the international community as to which paradigm
governs the U.S.'s use of force against al Qaeda in the Middle East and Africa.
The human rights, self-defense, and armed conflict paradigms have all been
asserted, and legitimate arguments exist for each applying at certain times and
places in the conflict.
A. Human Rights Law
Under Grotius' original bipartite legal structure, any act by a sovereign State
that is not within the context of an armed conflict or is legally responding to an
armed attack in self-defense,51 automatically falls under the framework of human
rights law. A requisite level of violence is required for a State to respond to any
type of attack or threat against its citizens or sovereignty.52 If a State has not
suffered from an armed attack, thereby activating a right of self-defense, or the
violence does not rise to a protracted intensity sufficient to constitute an armed
conflict, then a State's response to an attack or perceived threat is governed by
human rights law.53
Additionally, even where a State is legally employing military force, human
rights law governs where gaps exist in IHL. 4 Some argue that IHL is in fact a
subset of human rights law functioning as a lex specialis during armed conflicts,
thus accounting for the broad application of human rights law where gaps in IHL
50. See, e.g., Note by Secretary-General,Millennium Summit, supra note 8, at 164; Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and
Terrorism, U.N. GA/SCOR, 57th Sess., Annex, 13, U.N. Doc. A/57/273-S/2002/875 (2002), available
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC GEN/N02/512/97/IMG/N0251297.pdfOpenElement;
at
Christian J. Tams, The Use of ForceAgainst Terrorists,20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (2009).
51. The definitions and legal applications of both self-defense and armed conflict will be
addressed in Sections V(B) and V(C) respectively.
52. Alston Report, supra note 35, T 31-32.
53. ld. 31-33.
54. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 25
(July 8); Dinah Pokempner, Terrorism and Human Rights: The Legal Framework, in TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 19, 19 (Michael N. Schmitt & Gian Luca Beruto,
eds. 2002).
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exist. 55 Michael Newton, Professor of Vanderbilt University Law School,
however, disagrees with this contention, arguing that "[i]t is an oxymoron to argue
human rights law [because] IHL has a
that humanitarian law is a mere subset of
56
history."
diverse
much richer, longer, and
1. The Law Enforcement Model
A State acting within the corpus of human rights law must operate under the
"law enforcement model., 57 The law enforcement model permits non-military
58
This term refers to the
tactics, such as arrests, extradition, detention, and trial.
type of force that can be used, not who may employ the force. All government
officials authorized to execute police powers, "including a State's military and
model.5 9
security forces," may utilize such methods under the law enforcement
Organized crime and armed violence failing to rise to the level of an armed conflict
remains in the purview of domestic law enforcement.6 °
As discussed above, because no comprehensive definition of terrorism exists,
it is contentious as to whether terrorism is merely organized crime exclusively
governed by human rights or whether terrorism may rise to a sufficient level of
violence to warrant self-defense or armed conflict governed by IHL. Scholars,
such as Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell of the University of Notre Dame Law
School, argue that isolated acts of terrorism do not rise to the level of an armed
conflict. 61 She specifically contends that terrorism, generally, "is a crime" and
because "[t]errorist acts are usually sporadic," they do not rise to the requisite level
of violence to constitute an armed attack or an armed conflict. 62 Accordingly,
O'Connell argues that States do not have a right to act in self-defense or to use
terrorists, and instead, must use law enforcement measures to
military force against
63
combat terrorism.

55. Pokempner, supra note 54, at 19; see Alston Report, supra note 35, 29.
56. Michael Newton, Flying into the Future: Drone Warfare and the Changing Face of
HumanitarianLaw, 39 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 601, 602 (2011).

57. Alston Report, supra note 35, 31.
58. See Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 175 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008); Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of
Unmanned Targeting: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
lllth Cong. 2 (2010) (written statement of Mary Ellen O'Connell), available at
Congress
O'Connell
[hereinafter
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2010hr/042810oconnell.pdf
Statement]
31 (citing Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials,
59. Alston Report, supra note 35,
G.A. Res. 34/169, Annex, art. 1,U.N. Doc A/RES/34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979)).
60. NILS MELZER, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 24 (2009);

O'Connell Congress Statement, supra note 58, at 2.
61. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY
& POL'Y 344, 355 (2010); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Remarks: The Resort to Drones under International
Law, 39 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 585,597 (2011) [hereinafter O'Connell, Remarks].
62. O'Connell, Remarks, supranote 61, at 593.
63. Id.
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O'Connell's argument is grounded in State practice and evidence of opinio
juris demonstrated by States treating terrorism as a crime. A sufficient body of

State practice exists evidencing that States regularly employ law enforcement
tactics against terrorists. 64

For example, when combating terrorist attacks

perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the United Kingdom (U.K.) used
its police force to conduct surveillance and execute arrests. Even when a suit was
brought against the U.K. questioning the lethal force used against suspected IRA
terrorists carrying out a plot to bomb British interests, the court applied the
arbitrariness standard under human rights.6 5 Additionally, the U.K. employed law
enforcement measures to locate and target the perpetrators (later discovered to be
members of al Qaeda) of the London subway and bus bombings in 2005.66
Similarly, the Spanish successfully captured and tried the individuals responsible
for the Madrid train bombing of March 2004.67 The Security Council has likewise
used its Article 42 powers 68 on several occasions requiring States to respond to
terrorism with law enforcement measures, such as calling upon States to extradite
terrorists, 69 freeze the bank accounts of suspected terrorists, 70 and even to
domestically prosecute terrorists.7 1

Further, a wealth of evidence establishes States' opinio juris that terrorism is
a crime and does not fall under the scope of IHL. The U.K. and France expressly
stated in their reservations to the Additional Protocols of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions 72 their understanding that "the term 'armed conflict'
denotes a
situation of a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes
including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation., 73 Similarly, the

64. See, e.g., William K. Lietzau, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement or War?, in
TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 75, 77 (Michael N. Schmitt &
Gian Luca Beruto, eds. 2002); Lois M. DAVIS, ET AL., LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENTS

POST-9/11 Focus ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY xv (2010).
65. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 140 (1995).
66. Alan Cowell, Subway and Bus Blasts in London Kill at Least 37, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2005,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.comI/2005/07/08/intemational/europe/08bombings.html;
Paul
Reynolds,
Bomber
Video
'Points to al Qaeda ',
BBC NEWS,
Sept. 2,
2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/4208250.stm; London Police Investigation Timeline, CBC NEWS
ONLINE,
Aug.
11,
2005,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/london bombing/investigation
timeline.html (detailing the law enforcement measures carried out by British police to catch the
perpetrators of the bombing by investigating, arresting, and detaining individuals).
67. Paul White, Madrid Train Bombings Probe Finds No al Qaeda Link, USA TODAY, Mar. 9,
2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-03-09-madrid-x.htm.
68. U.N. Charter art. 42.
69. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1044, 4(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1044 (Jan. 31, 1996).
70. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 47, 11 (c); S.C. Res. 1735, 1 1(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735
(Dec. 22, 2006).
71. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 47, 2(e).
72. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15; Additional Protocol II, supra note 16.
73. Reservation of France (Apr. 11, 2001) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/D8041036
B40EBC44C1256A34004897B2?OpenDocument; Reservation of United Kingdom (July 2, 2002),
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that
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has recognized
law.",74
"terrorist activities.., are not subject to international humanitarian
2. Requirements for the Use of Force Under Human Rights Law

The use of force under human rights law is laid out primarily in Article 6 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), prescribing an
"arbitrary" standard.7 5 Under Article 6, "[e]very human being has the inherent
76
right to life .. .[and] [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.", Within
as a last resort.
the human rights context, the use of lethal force is permissible only
' 77
permitted; 78
Only killing that is "strictly and directly necessary to save life is
79
killing. 80
killing that is arbitrary or not necessary to save a life is an illegal
Law enforcement officials may take life where their lives or the lives of
82
others are imminently threatened, 8' but killing may not be the sole objective.
Where law enforcement methods alone are reasonably certain to end a threat of
violence, including terrorism, use of additional force is impermissible. 83 In sum, a
State may not act in self-defense or use military force against threats or acts of
violence if law enforcement measures, on their own, will, with a reasonable degree
of certainty, bring the perpetrators to justice.84 However, as O'Connell recognizes,
a State is permitted to derogate from the prohibition against lethal force only in

situations constituting an emergency. 85

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03FOF2EE757CC 1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument.
562 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
74. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Appeal,
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T,
Judgment, ]175 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
75. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
76. Id.
32-33.
77. Alston Report, supra note 35,
78. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6 (art. 6), T 3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
(1994); Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 116, doc. 5 rev. I
corr. 86-87 (2002).
79. ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 6(1).
80. See Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990); Michael N. Schmitt, State Sponsored Assassination in
Internationaland Domestic Law, 17 Yale J. Int'l L. 609, 644 (1992).
81. Alston Report, supra note 35, 32.
82. Alston Report, supra note 35, 9.
83. Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus as Bellum: A
Normative Framework, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES,
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF YORAM DINSTEIN 157, 171 (2007).

84. Id.
85. O'Connell, Remarks, supra note 61, at 597.. However, what constitutes an emergency
situation great enough to trigger the exception is highly controversial.
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3. Targeted Killings
One of the primary concerns within the international community regarding the
use of drones is that States utilize drones for their extraordinarily precise targeting
capabilities to kill terrorists, which many argue constitute extrajudicial or "targeted
killing. ' ,16 As the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary
Executions, Philip Alston, explains, a "targeted killing is the intentional,
premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force . . . against a specific individual

who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator., 87 The main criterion of a
targeted killing is that "lethal force is intentionally and deliberately used, with a
degree of pre-meditation, against an individual or individuals specifically
identified in advance by the perpetrator."'
States may legally employ targeted killing tactics within the context of a valid
act of self-defense or armed conflict, as long as the killing conforms to the jus in
bello requirements of necessity, proportionality, and distinction, which will be
further examined in Section VI. Targeted killings occurring during peacetime,
however, are illegal. 9 As discussed above, States acting in peacetime (outside of
the self-defense and armed conflict paradigms) and within the human rights
framework must limit acts of lethal force to situations where lives are imminently
threatened. Additionally, because killing may not be the sole objective, a targeted
killing is, by definition, illegal under the human rights paradigm.
In limited circumstances, a State's law enforcement personnel might
justifiably employ targeted killing tactics where an imminent threat exists to the
civilian population, but only if the overall goal of the mission is not to kill. 90
Interestingly, O'Connell posits that because drones use military force, they "are
therefore lawful only in armed conflict hostilities," 9' without acknowledging
limited exceptions for imminent threats. Her argument might be in response to the
way in which States are using drones. Currently, States are often employing
drones for targeted killings, but where no imminent threat exists.
By way of example, one of the first known U.S. drone attacks using a Hellfire
missile occurred on November 3, 2002, which struck a car in Yemen, killing
alleged al Qaeda leader Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harithi and five other men. 92 In

86. Many scholars also refer to this practice as "extrajudicial killing", "summary execution",
"assassination", or other similar terms. This article will refer exclusively, however, to the term
"targeted killing" without prejudice to these other terms of art.
87. Alston Report, supra note 35, 1.
88. Alston Report, supra note 35, 11 9 (citing NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (2008)).
89. See O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 599; Michael N. Schmitt, State Sponsored
Assassination in Internationaland Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 614 (1992).
90. Alston Report, supra note 35,
1, 9.
91. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 589.
92. Alston Report, supra note 35, 19 (citing Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the Risks
of the C.I.A. 's Covert Drone Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa fact mayer).
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response to this incident, then Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, and
Arbitrary Killings, Asma Jahangir, reported that the incident constituted "a clear
case of extrajudicial killing., 93 Another such occurrence perpetrated by the U.S.
Central Intelligent Agency was the targeting of wanted terrorist Baitullah Mehsud,
the leader of the Taliban in Pakistan. 94 Mehsud was in a civilian home with his
family and not engaging in any violent activity at the time of the attack. This
attack will be discussed in greater detail in Section VI regarding the principles of
IHL. However, under O'Connell's argument that terrorism must be combated with
law enforcement measures, this attack would be an illegal targeted killing.
In contrast to O'Connell and Alston, Professor Jordan Paust of the University
of Houston Law Center contends that the targeted killing policies of the United
States, Israel, and other States do not violate the arbitrary killing standard of
human rights.9 5 Instead, he reasons that a State's extraterritorial targeted killings
of individuals does not violate the "general human right to freedom from arbitrary
deprivation of life" because it "will only be applicable with respect to those
actual power, or effective control of the
persons who are within the jurisdiction,
96
drone.",
a
using
entity
other
state or
Both the ICCPR and ICESCR are limited in scope territorially, binding only
upon State parties, requiring them to extend human rights protections to their
citizens or persons within that State's sovereign territory. However, because the
requirement that a State not arbitrarily deprive individuals of the right to life is an
erga omnes duty9 7 (an obligation owed to all States by all States)98 and most likely
a jus cogens norm, 99 States are obligated to ensure individuals the right to life
regardless of a State's jurisdiction, actual power, or effective control of an
individual. Therefore, any targeted killing of an individual committed by a State
outside of the context of lawful self-defense or an armed conflict, and when no
individual is imminently threatened, including those carried out by weaponized
drones, implicate human rights violations.
B. The Law Governing the Right of Self-Defense
A State may use force in self-defense in response to an armed attack.' 00 This
is an inherent right of all States, codified in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
93. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Civ. and Pol. Rights, Including the
Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions, Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary
Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Asma Jahangir, 19, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/3 (Jan. 13,
2003).
94. Mayer, supra note 92.
95. Jordan J. Paust, Permissible Self-Defense Targeting and the Death of bin Laden, 39 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 569, 569-70 (2011) (arguing that the U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan are permissible
acts of self-defense, not requiring consent from Pakistan).
96. Id. at 573-74.
97. Paul Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability:Peremptory Norms of Jus
Cogens, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 147 (B.G. Ramcharan ed. 1985).

98. Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3,
99. Gormley, supra note 99, at 147.
100. U.N. Charter art. 51.

33 (Feb. 5).
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states that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security." A parallel right exists under customary
international law. 10' The customary right to self-defense "exist[s] alongside treaty
law" and is not superseded by the U.N. Charter.' 0 2 The co-existence of the right to
self-defense under both treaty and customary law is rooted in the very nature of
sovereignty; the State, as the supreme authority under international law, must be
empowered to respond to threats against its territorial sovereignty or nationals.
Newton argues that it is "modern consensus that the sovereign right of self-defense
did not originate in Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter and is not restricted to
10 3
responses enumerated therein." '
The right to self-defense includes both individual and collective selfdefense.10 4 A State may simultaneously possess both an individual and a collective
right to self-defense, and the State may act under both or either. For example,
State A and State B both suffer an armed attack from the same actor and State A
requests State B's assistance in self-defense. State B may use force in individual
self-defense for the original attack, as well as use force in collective self-defense
because of the request from State A. It was this precise scenario the United States
attempted to claim it was operating under in its submission to the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in the Nicaraguacase.105 The U.S. defended its financial
and logistical support of military and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua
by contending it was acting under both a right to individual self-defense as well as
collective self-defense on behalf of several Central American countries.' 1 6 The
Court found, however, that because the U.S. had not received a request from the
States it was claiming to be acting on behalf of, it could not invoke collective self-

defense.107
Three basic issues arise when a State invokes a right to self-defense, and each
is contested to some degree in international legal scholarship: 1) whether the State
has suffered an armed attack; 2) whether the armed attack must be attributableto
another State; and 3) where the State may use force in responding to the armed
attack. These three issues essentially define the parameters for a State's right to
self-defense. Once these threshold issues are settled, the State must comply with

101. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
176 (June 26).
102. Id.
103. Newton, supra note 56, at 604.
104. U.N. Charter art. 51; Military and ParamilitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at 176.
105. Counter Memorial of United States, Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Pleadings, 202 (Aug. 17, 1984).
106. Id. at
202, 254.
107. Military and ParamilitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at
T 165.
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two restrictions, requiring that any use of force in self-defense be both necessary
and proportionate.108
1. Armed Attack
Most, but not all, scholars agree that the right of self-defense is limited to
situations where a State has suffered an armed attack.0 9 The more controversial
issue relates to what constitutes an armed attack, as the term itself provides little
guidance.
A minority of scholars argue that a State may respond in self-defense to any
°
threat, even those that do not rise to the level of an armed attack." The reasoning
is that a State should not be required to withhold a response of self-defense until
the threat escalates into an armed attack.' 1 1 Requiring so would create a gap in the
law where a State could not respond to serious threats against its nationals or
territory, which would render the right to self-defense meaningless. 1 2 It is also
argued that the language of U.N. Charter Article 51, which preserves the inherent3
attack."1
right to self-defense that preexisted the U.N., does not require an armed
Article 51 articulates that a State has "the inherent right of... self-defence if an
armed attack occurs,"' "14 and the lack of conditional language could indicate that
the framers did not intend to limit the right to self-defense to "if and only if' an
armed attack occurs." 15
The majority of scholars agree, however, that a State must suffer an armed
attack as a prerequisite to invoking the right to use force in self-defense.' 16 The17
I.C.J. has loosely defined armed attack in several cases, including Nicaragua"
and Oil Platforms. 18 Armed attack, as a concept, exists less as a cohesive

108. CASSESE, supra note 19, at 355.
109. ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE:
BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 154-55 (1993); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENCE 182-85 (4th ed. 2005); Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in THE CHARTER OF THE

UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 803 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002); Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the
Legality of Pre-Emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 227, 229 (2003).
110. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense in Modern
InternationalLaw, in JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JUDGE STEPHEN M.
ORDER (1961);

SCHWEBEL 530, 580 (1994); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1620, 1634 (1984).

111. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 26) (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel 173).
112. SCHWEBEL, supra note 110, at 580.
113. Military and ParamilitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
(dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel 173); BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 732.
114. U.N. Charter art. 51.
115. Military and ParamilitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
(dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel 173).
116. See supra note 109.
117. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
191, 195 (June 26).
64, 72 (Nov. 6).
118. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 161,
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definition and more as an interplay of multiple sub-definitions. According to the
I.C.J., only the "'most grave forms of the use of force" constitute an armed
20
attack." 9 An armed attack must reach a certain significant scale of violence,
above "mere frontier incidents."
As O'Connell points out, sporadic rocket fire
or small groups
of persons crossing the border would not rise to the level of an
22
armed attack. 1

Some argue, however, that smaller scale attacks constitute armed attacks
triggering a State's right to self-defense, "[u]nless the scale and effects are trifling,
below the de minimis threshold.' ' 23 In fact, the I.C.J. determined that even a
solitary attack on a ship rises to the level of an armed attack.1 24 In line with this
thinking, I.C.J. Judge Jennings argued that it would be dangerous to unnecessarily
restrict the right to self-defense, as 25it would limit the State's ability to legally
respond to a threat to its sovereignty.
Another area of contention regarding an armed attack is whether a string of
small-scale attacks can be evaluated as a whole in order to rise to the level of an
armed attack. This primarily becomes an issue when discussing acts of terrorism
that generally employ "needle prick tactics" to achieve results that could not be
achieved by a single concentrated attack. 126 As O'Connell argues, the sporadic
nature of terrorist attacks is precisely the reason why States should be required to
respond with law enforcement methods rather than military force.1 27 O'Connell
and others maintain that strings of terrorist attacks must be evaluated on a case-bycase basis and cannot accumulate to produce an armed attack. 128 However, others
of attacks is justified when violence is carried out as
contend that the accumulation
29
a coordinated campaign.

119. Military and ParamilitaryActivities In andAgainst Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at

1191.
120. Id. 195.
121. Id.
122. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 591.
123. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 195.
124. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. at T 72.
125. Military and ParamilitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
(dissenting opinion of Judge Jennings, pp. 543-44).
126. Yehuda Blum, State Response to Acts of Terrorism, 19 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 223, 233 (1976).
127. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 593.
128. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 898
(2002).
129. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J.
168, 146 (Dec. 19); Military and ParamilitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua(Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. at
231; see Schmitt, supra note 83, at 169-70 (referencing the I.C.J.'s
reasoning in
Nicaraguathat mere frontier incidents do not rise to the level of an armed attack but then adopting
Yoram Dinstein's dismissal of the Nicaraguaholding by arguing that mere frontier incidents and small
scale attacks will constitute an armed attack when they rise above the de minimis threshold).
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2. Attribution of Armed Attacks: State or Non-State
The second issue relates to attribution of the armed attack. It remains
unsettled as to whether a State suffering an armed attack must be able to attribute
that attack to another State in order to legally use force in self-defense, or whether
a State may respond to an armed attack carried out by a non-State actor, including
terrorists groups like al Qaeda. Some scholars like O'Connell maintain that
attribution to a State is absolutely required, and without it, a State must operate
within the law enforcement/human rights paradigm.' 3M This argument is supported
by I.C.J. cases such as Nicaragua,13 1 Oil Platforms,3 2 and The Wall Advisory
Opinion,'3 3 which consider attribution of an armed attack to a State actor as a
necessary requirement for self-defense. These holdings draw from the U.N.
General Assembly's Definition of Aggression, which includes acts of aggression
as "[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State." Put
differently, an armed attack may be carried out by non-State actors acting on
behalf of a State.
Several tests exist to determine State responsibility in this context, including
"effective control" as set forth in Nicaragua,'34 "overall control" derived from the
Tadic decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Formal
Yugoslavia, 35 and applicable provisions from the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility. 36 Regardless of the test applied, the attribution requirement
predicates a lawful act of self-defense upon the occurrence of an armed attack
attributable (under one of the aforementioned tests) to a foreign State. Violent acts
carried out unilaterally by a non-State actor would not trigger the right of selfdefense.
Other scholars maintain that attribution is not required and that a State has a
right to use force in self-defense against a non-State actor, regardless of the
involvement of another State.137 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter articulates a State's
130. See O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 590-91.
131. Military and ParamilitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at

195.
132. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 161, 72 (Nov. 6).
133. The Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004

I.C.J. 136,

139 (July 9).

134. Military and ParamilitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at

115.
135. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal, 77 120-21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
136. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts arts. 2, 8, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N.
GAOR 56th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
137. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 168
(Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans 28); The Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. (separate opinion of Judge Higgins 7 33); The
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
(declaration of Judge Buergenthal 6); CASSESE, supra note 19, at 355; DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at
206, 216; Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L
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inherent right to self-defense "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations,"'' 38 without mentioning attribution to another State. In response to
the increased threat from non-State transnational terrorist organizations, I.C.J.
Judge Kooijmans stated in his separate opinion in the Armed Activities case that "it
would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to self-defence merely
because there is no attacker State, and the Charter does not so require. ,,139
In contrast to O'Connell's argument for attribution based on I.C.J.
jurisprudence, this stance relies heavily on State practice. During the Caroline
Incident of 1837, Canada faced an armed insurrection mounted from U.S. soil led
by non-State actors. The United Kingdom, Canada's sovereign at that time,
responded to the armed insurrection by sinking the insurgent's supply ship, the
Caroline, while it was in U.S. waters. 140 Both States recognized that self-defense
was appropriate when an armed attack emanated from a non-State actor acting
14
alone, and neither State attempted to attribute the insurgent's actions to the U.S. 1
More recently, the U.S. based its use of force in Afghanistan against al Qaeda for
the 1998 embassy bombings on the right to self-defense under Article 51.142
Additionally, after the attacks of September 11 th , Security Council Resolutions
1368 and 1373 recognized "the inherent right of... self-defence as recognized by
the Charter" in response to "any act of international terrorism," regardless of
143
attribution to a State.
3. Location of the Use of Force in Self-Defense
Arguably the most controversial issue regarding self-defense is the location
where a State may lawfully use force in exercising its right to self-defense. As
O'Connell points out, while there are concerns about the attacks carried out in
Afghanistan against al Qaeda, the real concern is whether the attacks carried out
144
against al Qaeda in third States, such as Yemen and Somalia, are lawful.
O'Connell asserts that without attribution to the State where the targeting is
occurring, the use of force is unlawful. 145 Conversely, Paust and others contend
that a State's right to territorial integrity is not absolute and that under certain

L. 559, 563-64 (1999).
138. U.N. Charter art. 51.
139. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J.
(separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans T 30).
140. R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 83-84 (1938).
141. Id.
142. Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, ASIL TASK FORCE ON
TERRORISM, 10 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
143. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 47; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 47; Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. (separate opinion of Judge Simma T
11); The Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
136 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans
35); Schmitt, supra note 83, at 161; Jordan J.
Paust, Self-Defense Targetingof Non-State Actors and Permissibilityof U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan,
19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237, 238-39 (2010).
144. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 592.
145. See id. at 590-91, 594.
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its right to self-defense in the territory of a
circumstances a State may exercise
1 46
attack.
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for
responsible
not
State
The argument against the legality of targeting terrorists in States outside of
the traditional notion of a battlefield relies on the foundational principle of
territorial integrity of all States, codified in U.N. Charter Article 2(4). Under
Article 2(4), all States have the right to be free from other States using force in
their territory. In determining where a State may target terrorists, this fundamental
concept of territorial integrity couples with the previously mentioned attribution
requirement. Together, these two notions form the asserted rule that under the law
of self-defense a State's territorial integrity prevails unless the armed attack, which
instigated the right to self-defense, is attributable to a foreign State.1 47 Only then
may the victim State use force in self-defense in the sovereign territory of the
foreign State. Should the non-State actor be located in the territory of a State that
was not responsible for the armed attack, the victim State must rely solely on law
enforcement methods governed by human rights.
In contrast, scholars such as Paust assert that territorial integrity is only one of
many values enshrined in the U.N. Charter, and the right to self-defense may
supersede territorial integrity, provided it is carried out within the confines of the
law of self-defense. 148 Paust's argument is premised upon the notion that a State
may target individuals directly participating in the armed attack, regardless of the
location of those individuals. For example, the U.S. is permitted to target members
of al Qaeda operating from Yemen, despite the fact that an armed attack is not
attributable to the State of Yemen. However, the U.S. must limit its targeting to
the combatants alone, and not the State of Yemen. This is a fine, but important
distinction.
Proponents of this point of view rationalize infringing another State's territory
based on that State's failure to meet its obligation to deny safe haven to non-State
actors, including terrorists. 149 A State is considered to be providing safe haven
when it knows or should know that non-State actors are carrying out attacks
against other States from any portion of its territory.1 50 All States have an
affirmative obligation to deny safe haven to terrorists,' and a State that is unable
or unwilling to meet this obligation cannot expect to preserve its territorial
integrity against lawful measures of self-defense. 152 The porous, mountainous
146. Paust, supra note 98, at 572-73.
147. The Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J., at T 139.
148. U.N. Charter art. 51; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 55 (Apr. 9); Schmitt, supra
note 83, at 179.
149. DINSTEIN, supranote 109, at 244.
150. Id.
151. S.C. Res. 1378, supra note 47; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 47; Declaration on Friendly
Relations, supra note 9.
152. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 247; see Ved P. Nanda, Terrorism, International Law and
InternationalOrganizations,in LAW IN THE WAR ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 1, 10 (Ved P. Nanda

ed. 2005); Alston Report, supra note 35,

35; Wedgwood, supra note 137, at 565.
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border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is often considered a safe haven, as
Pakistan is not able to consistently prevent that portion of its territory from being
used as a terrorist stronghold."5 3 U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor Harold
Koh used this reasoning to justify the U.S.'s ability to kill suspected terrorists in
Pakistan's and other States' territory based' on
their lack of "willingness and ability
54
,1
poses.
target
the
threat
the
...to suppress
The general affirmative obligation that every State not knowingly allow "its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States" was first
articulated by the I.C.J. in the Corfu Channel case.155 This concept was confirmed
in the context of transnational terrorism in Security Council Resolution 1373,
passed shortly after September 11, 2001.156 Security Council Resolution 1373
confirms that a State's failure to prevent its territory from being used as a safe
haven triggers the right to self-defense against the non-State actors located within
the host State's territory. 57 The exercise of self-defense in this context is an
exception to the host State's right to territorial58integrity, waived because of its
failure to comply with international obligations.
Simply put, if a State does not exercise due diligence in preventing terrorist
attacks on other States, the victim State may take action in self-defense and has no
obligation to wait until the host State comes into compliance with its international
obligations. As Lord Ashburn queried in response to the CarolineIncident, "[h]ow
long could a Government, having the paramount duty of protecting its own people,
be reasonably expected to wait for what they had then no reason to expect?"'' 59
When the argument is framed in such a manner, it becomes evident that a State
should not have to defer to another State's territorial sovereignty or await consent
to use force in self-defense in that State's territory where that State does not
control its territory or has no legitimate means of controlling its territory, such as
Somalia or other failed or failing States.

153. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, Country
Reports on Terrorism,
Chapter 3 - Terrorist Safe Havens (2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64333.htm.
154. Harold Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law, Address at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm [hereinafter Koh Speech].
155. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9); accord U.S. Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 3, 1 67 (May 24); S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A)
No. 10, at 4 (Sept. 7).
156. S.C. Res 1373, supra note 47.
157. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 247; Schmitt, supra note 83, at 176-77.
158. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 55.
159. Jennings, supra note 140, at 82 (quoting letter from Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster, July 28,
1842).
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4. Conditions on a State's Exercise of the Right to Self-Defense
Necessity, Proportionality, and Imminence

-

International law restricts the use of force in self-defense to that which is
necessary to quell an imminent attack, and proportionateto this purpose. 6 ° The
terms necessity and proportionalityare also used in other contexts, including in the
jus in bello analysis.' 6' The terms have different meanings and legal standards
depending on which area of the law they are being applied. Thus, it is imperative
to understand which type of necessity and proportionality are being referred to.
Certain scholars, including O'Connell, contend that these words derive from a
fundamental common definition,' 62 while others, such as Newton, argue they are
highly distinguishable. 63 Regardless of the academic debate on the fundamental
similarities of the terms, the basic legal definitions of both sets of terms and their
application are different. Thus, this article completely distinguishes necessity and
proportionalityunder the law of self-defense from their use within thejus in bello
framework.
The principle of necessity in the context of self-defense requires that force
only be used when there is no other alternative course of action to deter the attacks
against the State. 64 If the State cannot rely on diplomatic, 65 or law enforcement
measures166 to stop the attacks, it may respond with necessary force. This
restriction on self-defense essentially requires67that a State use force only when no
other viable option exists to deter the attacks.'
Proportionalitylimits a State's response "to those actions necessary to defeat
the armed attack"' 168 but does not require "symmetry between the mode of the
initial attack and the mode of the response.' ' 169 One method of gauging
of force
proportionality is to use an objective standard,170 comparing the quantum
7
'
and counter-force used, as well as the casualties and damages sustained.'

160. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 161, T 43 (Nov. 6); Legality of the Threat or Use of
41 (July 8): Military and Paramilitary
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1176 (June 26).
161. See infra Section VI.
162. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 591.
163. Newton, supra note 56, at 610.
164. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 221; Alston Report, supra note 35, 43.
165. Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J., at 43; DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 237.
166. Schmitt, supra note 83, at 171.
167. ld.; DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 221.
168. Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing October 7 rh: A Case Study in the Laifulness of
CounterterroristMilitaty Operations, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND

RESPONSES 39, 42 (Michael N. Schmitt & Gian Luca Beruto eds., 2002); see also Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Higgins 5); Alston Report, supra note 35, 43.
169. Alston Report, supra note 35, 43; accordSchmitt, supra note 83, at 172.
170. Enzo Cannizzaro, Contextualizing Proportionality:Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the
Lebanese War, 88 INT'L. R. RED CROSS 779, 787-88 (2006).
171. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 237.
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A State may use force in self-defense against an imminent threat where the
necessity of self-defense "is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment of deliberation. 1 72 The debate in this area revolves around
the meaning of imminent. Do the missiles have to be in the sky and on their way?
Or does the finger have to be on the trigger? Or is concrete planning of an attack
sufficient? It is clear that the missile in the air scenario satisfies the imminence
requirement. After that, one finds little agreement and a variety of terms to
describe the different levels of imminence.
Three terms are often employed when describing the varying degrees of
imminence: preventive, anticipatory, and preemptive. Preventive describes a use
of force to combat an intangible and theoretical prospective threat in order to
prevent that threat from coming to fruition. 173 Under the Bush administration,
preventive self-defense was misnamed as "preemptive," most likely in an effort to
justify U.S. military action after September I1th to quell potential future al Qaeda
as an illegal use
attacks.1 74 Preventive self-defense is almost universally regarded
75
self-defense.1
to
right
the
of
exercise
valid
a
not
and
force
of
Preemptory and anticipatory are used sometimes interchangeably and there
are multiple definitions for each. In general, these terms encompass acts of selfdefense in response to attacks that are on the brink of being launched or where one
176
attack has already occurred and the State learns more attacks are planned.
Anticipatory self-defense allows a State to respond when a group harbors the intent
and means to carry out attacks, there is no effective alternative for preventing
them, and the State must act immediately or risk missing the opportunity to thwart
the attacks.177 Yoram Dinstein also employs the term "interceptory" to define a
category of preemptive self-defense in response to acts which are already
launched, arguing that anticipatory self-defense is unlawful while interceptory selfdefense is permitted, 78 but in essence, the distinction between interceptory and
anticipatory is academic.

172. Caroline Incident, Letters from Webster to Fox, 29 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1129, 113738 (1840-41).
173. O'Connell, supra note 142, at 2, n.10.
174. See id. (citing Mike Allen & Karen DeYoung, Bush: U.S. Will Strike First at Enemies; In West
Point Speech, President Lays Out Broader U.S. Policy, WASH. POST, June 2, 2002, at A01); Miriam
Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Deftnse, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599, 599 (explaining
that, "Although the administration has characterized its new approach as "preemptive," it is more
accurate to describe it as "preventive" self-defense. Rather than trying to preempt specific, imminent
threats, the goal is to prevent more generalized threats from materializing.").
175. See, e.g., Note by Secretary-General, Millennium Summit, supra note 8, ' 189-91 (explaining
that unilateral acts of preventive self-defense, as opposed to collective preventive actions with Security
Council authorization, contravene the U.N. Charter).
176. Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantineand Self-Defence, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597,
601 (1963); Schachter, supra note 110, at 1634.
177. Schmitt, supra note 83, at 174.
178. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 168, 182-85.

2011

CLARIFYING THE LAW

Scholars in favor of a preemptory or anticipatory right to self-defense
maintain that any other interpretation would render the right to self-defense
meaningless 79 by requiring States to "assume the posture of 'sitting ducks"' in the
face of an imminent threat.1 80 This is often asserted in the context of self-defense
against terrorists because their attacks are designed to be undetectable until they
are launched.1 81 Between attacks, terrorists continue to plan future attacks,
creating a threat which is "underway, not simply potential."1 82 Under this theory,
the principle of imminence is satisfied when there is a group with the avowed
purpose of carrying out attacks and the group possesses the means to carry out the
may use selfattack. 183 Such a situation creates a continuous attack and a State
84
attacks.1
terrorist
ongoing
and
imminent
the
defense to ward off
On the other side of the issue, scholars argue that such a broad interpretation
of imminence is dangerous, allowing for the overly aggressive use of force when
not absolutely necessary, and thus violating the previously described principle of
necessity. Proponents of a narrow interpretation of imminence usually rely upon
the Caroline Incident and contend that any act of self-defense must be in response
to a threat that "is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment of deliberation."' 85 Any preemptive right of self-defense is limited to
attack be already mounted 86 and
interceptive prevention, requiring that 18an
7
corroborated by "substantiated evidence."'
C. Armed Conflict
The last way in which a State may combat terrorism is while acting within the
context of an armed conflict. If the use of force rises to the level of an armed
conflict, international humanitarian law applies,'8 but human rights law continues
to govern any legal gaps.' 89 As is discussed within thejus in bello portion of this
article, IHL provides a State greater legal latitude when using lethal force. The
human rights standard prescribes that killing is only permitted to prevent an
imminent threat to law enforcement officials or to the public. Under IHL,

179. Schmitt, supra note 83, at 174.
180. McDougal, supra note 176, at 601.
181. Id. at 173.
182. Wedgwood, supra note 137, at 564-65.
183. Schmitt, supra note 83, at 174.
184. Wedgwood, supra note 137, at 564-65.
185. Caroline Incident, Lettersfrom Webster to Fox, supra note 172.
186. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 187; Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing
States, 64 AM. J.INT'L L. 809, 821 (1970); W. Michael Reisman
Norms Governing the Use of Force bti
& Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J.INT'L
L. 525, 531 (2006).
187. Franck, supra note 186, at 821.
188. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art, 2; Ved P. Nanda, Introductory Essay:
InternationalLaw Implications of the UnitedStates' "War on Terror", 37 DEN'. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
513, 514 (2009).
189. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ' 25
(July 8); Pokempner, supra note 54, at 19.
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however, a State is permitted to kill designated "combatants" and to incur civilian
casualties so long as they comply with thejus in bello principles.
The advantage of using lethal force under more lenient legal standards is
likely the reason behind the U.S. and Israel's arguments that each is involved in an
armed conflict against known terrorist organizations. 190 Alston recognizes the
inherent danger of allowing States to "unilaterally extend the law of armed conflict
to situations that are essentially matters of law enforcement that must, under
international law, be dealt with under the framework of human rights
.,,91 He
voices concerns that in so doing, States "are not only effectively declaring war
against a particular group, but eviscerating key and necessary distinctions between
international law frameworks that restricts States' ability to kill arbitrarily."' 192 In
essence, Alston contends that States abusing the distinctions between human
rights, self-defense, and armed conflict could lead to potential catastrophic results
193
on the existing legal frameworks which limit States' right to use force.
The law of armed conflict is codified in the Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols, whose terms have evolved into binding customary
obligations.' 94
An armed conflict must be either international or noninternational. 195 An international armed conflict is present where two or more
States engage their armed forces with the others', regardless of the intensity or
duration of the clashes.' 96 Historically, an armed conflict between two States was
termed a "war," however, this traditional nomenclature is nearly obsolete given
that States regularly use military force against their enemies without formally
declaring war. 197
Non-international armed conflicts are those not involving two States, but
rather a State responding to violence by non-State actors. 98 Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II governs these conflicts.' 99 The
rather vague treaty law has recently received much attention given the increasing
number of non-international armed conflicts. While international armed conflicts
190. HCJ 769/02 The Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The Gov't of Israel 57(6) IsrSC 285,
P 21 [2006] (Isr.); Koh speech, supra note 154.
191. Alston Report, supra note 35, 48.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL, supra note 35.
195. Fourth Geneva Convention, supranote 14, arts. 2-3.
196. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 2(1); Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6, Case No. IT94-1-T, Judgment, 561 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE

FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (1952); ; U.K.
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 28-29 (2005).

197. Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-first Century War and Its
Possible Implicationsfor the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1051, 1055 (1998) (arguing
that, "The old paradigms of war and warfare are being broken as we enter the next millennium.").
198. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T at 562.
199. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 14, common art. 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note
16; Alston Report, supra note 35, 50.
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conventionally provided robust protections for civilians compared to the minimal
protections in non-international armed conflicts, customary international law has
solidified the higher standards of an international conflict codified in Additional
Protocol I for all armed conflicts, regardless of whether they are international or
non-international. 0 0
The International Committee of the Red Cross, responsible for drafting the
Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, intended Common Article 3
governing non-international armed conflicts to be read broadly and have the widest
possible application. 20 1 The development of criteria for establishing the existence
of a non-international armed conflict has occurred at a customary level, rather than
conventional, primarily at the United Nations' ad hoc criminal tribunals. In
determining whether a non-international armed conflict exists, the primary focus of
the analysis must be on the actions of the non-State actor, rather than State actor.20 2

A non-international armed conflict exists where: 1) sufficiently organized armed
groups carry out armed violence; 2) in an intense; and 3) protracted manner against
2 4
a State. 2 03

A non-State actor only needs a minimal degree of organization

0

sufficient to facilitate collective, armed, anti-government actions.20 5 A State's use
of its military
against the non-State
20 6

actor can

be indicia of sufficient

organization.
The second two elements of a non-international armed conflict, intensity and
duration, are met when the violence rises above those "situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of a similar nature." 20 7

Intensity is measured by, inter alia, the

seriousness of the attacks, expanse and duration of clashes, Security Council
involvement in the issue, 20 8 the employment of military weapons and tactics, 20 9 and
200. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 79 (July 8); Tadi&6, Case No. IT-94-1-T at 562.

201.

JEAN PICTET, INT'L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, IV, GENE'A CO\VENTION

RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR

36 (1958).

202. See Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-I-T at 7 566-67 (analyzing the existence of an non-international
armed conflict based primarily on the Bosnian Serbs' actions and whether they were sufficiently
organized armed group).
203. Id. 1561-62.
204. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment,
248 (Jan. 27, 2000) ("The
expression "armed conflicts" introduces a material criterion: the existence of open hostilities between
armed forces which are organized to a greater or lesser degree. Internal disturbances and tensions,
characterized by isolated or sporadic acts of violence, do not therefore constitute armed conflicts in a
legal sense, even if the government is forced to resort to police forces or even armed units for the
purpose of restoring law and order. Within these limits, non-international armed conflicts are situations
in which hostilities break out between armed forces or organized armed groups within the territory of a
single State").
205. Alston Report, supra note 35, 52.
206. LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 38-39 (2002).
207. Additional Protocol I, supra note 16.
208. Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 41177 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
209. See id.; Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 565 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
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the number of civilians affected. 210 Additionally, the duration of the conflict must
involve "protracted armed violence., 21 1 As discussed within the human rights

section of this article,212 and affirmed by Additional Protocol
II, isolated acts of
21 3
violence do not arise to the level of an armed conflict.
Armed attacks by non-State actors, activating the right of self-defense, may
also rise to a requisite level of violence to constitute an armed conflict. 2 4 Thus, a

State might permissibly respond in self-defense to an armed attack, while
simultaneously acting within an armed conflict. The relevance of the distinction
between armed attacks and armed conflict is that in responding to an armed attack,
a State must ensure that each and every response is necessary and proportionate to
the armed attack,1 5 whereas a State acting within in armed conflict must only

ensure that each use of force is necessary and proportionate to the overall military
advantage.216 Therefore, a State, arguably, is less confined by the law when using
force during an armed conflict.
The leniency created by the legal regime of armed conflict as compared to
self-defense has prompted the United States to assert both self-defense and an
armed conflict in its official position, and the associated legal justifications,
relating to its uses of force in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. Specifically,
Koh defended U.S. drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen as acts
within "a war of self-defense against an enemy that attacked us on September 11,
2001 .... 211 Yet at the same time, Koh claims the U.S. is engaged in an "armed
conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces.
,218
Koh made no remarks as to whether "al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated
forces" comprises a single sufficiently organized armed group or multiple armed
groups carrying out this violence. Further, there is controversy in the legal
community over whether the violence carried out by these groups individually or
in concert meets the requisite level of intensity or duration to constitute a noninternational armed conflict. O'Connell maintains that these justifications are
"mutually contradictory ' 21 9 because the U.S. must be either responding to
ongoing 220 armed attacks implicating the right to self-defense or engaged in
violence that rises to the requisite level constituting an armed conflict.
the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
210. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T at
182-83.
211. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T at 561.
212. See supra Section V(A).
213. Additional Protocol II, supra note 16, art. 1(2); Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1-T at 562.
214. An armed attack or series of armed attacks that activate a right to self-defense will also
constitute an armed conflict if the non-state actors are sufficiently organized and the violence meets the
intensity and protraction requirements of Geneva Convention IV and Additional Protocol II.
215. See supra Section V(B)(iv).
216. See infra Section VI.
217. Koh speech, supra note 154.
218. Id.
219. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 592.
220. The attacks must be ongoing, as the fight to self-defense in response to the original armed
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Yet the idea that these two paradigms are mutually exclusive is not
universally accepted. Instead, a State may be acting in self-defense against a State,
which is simultaneously an armed conflict, or alternatively, the State may respond
in self-defense to violence by a non-State actor and the violence rises to a
sufficient intensity and duration that it evolves into an armed conflict.
Accordingly, it is possible that a State may have initially used force in selfdefense, but later is using force against that same enemy in the context of an armed
conflict.
VI.

JUS IN BELLO: LIMITING THE MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE

The jus in bello principles of international humanitarian law limit the means
and the methods of uses of force a State may implement in order to carry out an
armed conflict or an act of self-defense.2 2' Once a State begins to engage in the
use of force, it has an obligation to do so in a manner consistent with IHL, which is
also referred to by U.S. military as the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Three
primary principles of IHL work in tandem to restrict the way in which a State may
carry out a specific attack: necessity, proportionality,and distinction. As discussed
above, while there is an overlap of terms, these principles are wholly distinct from
the jus ad bellum analysis of necessity, proportionality, and imminence required
when acting in self-defense. 22
Humanitarian law requires a State use military force that is necessary to
achieve the goal of the military operation,223 only causes incidental loss of life or
civilian casualties that is proportionate to the military objective,224 and
These
distinguishes between legitimate military targets and civilians. 2 5
fundamental rules are codified within the Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols, but also "constitute intransgressible principles of international
customary law., 22 6 Humanitarian law does not require perfection in the execution
of a military attack, 227 nor does it prohibit all civilian casualties.22 8 However, these
three interrelated and indivisible principles assessed collectively are intended to
provide sufficient protection for civilians.

attack of September 11 a is no longer consistent with the self-defense element of imminence.
221. CASSESE, supra note 19, at 995; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful and Unlawful Wars, in LAW
IN THE WAR ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 79, 86 (2005); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
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In order to illustrate the challenges of thejus in bello analysis, this article will
analyze these principles using the facts of a specific drone attack carried out by the
U.S. in Pakistan in August of 2009 against Baitullah Mehsud. As the primary
Taliban leader operating from Pakistan, Mehsud was responsible for leading vast
numbers of loyal fighters in years of attacks against the U.S. and its allies,
including suicide bombings and cross-border attacks on U.S. and allied troops.229
He was also allegedly behind the December
2007 assassination of former Prime
230
Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan.
After several failed attempts to eliminate Mehsud, the U.S. military finally
located him at his father-in-law's house. 23 1 At the time of the attack, Mehsud was
on the roof of the house with his wife, receiving medication via drip infusion for a
kidney ailment caused by diabetes.232 The drone strike, carried out by a U.S.
Predator Drone equipped with Hellfire missiles 233 killed Mehsud and eleven other
civilians, including his wife and doctor. 234 This section will articulate the jus in
bello analysis and the applicable IHL principles as applied to this particular drone
strike against Mehsud.
A. Necessity
Military necessity permits a State to employ a degree and type of force that is
required to achieve a concrete military objective at the earliest possible moment
with the minimum expenditure of life and resources.2 35 The destruction of civilian
236
life and property is permitted, so long as it is necessary to the military objective;
237
any unnecessary use of force results in wanton killing and destruction.
In context of the attack against Mehsud, the principle of necessity requires
that the use of a Hellfire missile was necessary to achieve the military objective of
taking out a top Taliban leader. The necessity of taking out a terrorist military
commander is debatable. Some argue that these kinds of military objectives
strategically disrupt the terrorist organization and hamper the further planning of
terrorist attacks.2 38 Others, such as O'Connell, contend that executing high-level
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terrorists is counterproductive, as it only incites animosity and does not weaken the
terrorist cell, as the leaders are easily and quickly replaced.239
Additionally, the necessity analysis considers that Mehsud had proven to be a
difficult target, and moreover, that the roof top identification of him provided a
rare clear line of site. This demonstrates that because Mehsud was an elusive
military target, the time, place, and circumstances under which the drone attack
was executed fulfilled the requirement of necessity.
Further, the necessity analysis includes the timing and the resources needed to
complete the military objective. 240 Although the U.S. could have launched a fullscale ground invasion in order to kill Mehsud, it would have required an
unnecessary expenditure of American lives and resources.
B. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality acts as a check on the broader principle of
necessity. The expected collateral damage must not be excessive in relation to the
anticipated military advantage. 241 The first step in a proportionality analysis is a
prospective assessment that considers the anticipated collateral damage 242 rather
than a post-execution evaluation of how the military operation actually unfolded.243
While always regrettable, civilian casualties are lawful245in this analysis, 244 and "the
general immunity that civilians enjoy is not absolute.,
The second step in a proportionality analysis relates to evaluating the
targeting State's expected military gains from the attack. While this assessment
must be completed for each and every intended attack,246 debate arises over the
scope of the anticipated military advantage a State may use to justify its attack.
Several scholars argue that the specific attack must be weighed against the specific
military objective an individual attack will achieve.247 Others maintain that the
anticipated advantage can be assessed as a whole, which allows consideration of
248
For
the overarching military objective for the entire military campaign.
example, the U.S. could justify its killing of the eleven civilians surrounding
Mehsud as collateral damage weighed against either the specific military objective
of eliminating Mehsud or the overall goal of eliminating the Taliban. The former
analysis arguably creates a greater restriction on States, as only the military
advantage of a specific target can be used to justify the collateral damage to
civilian life and objects. The latter evaluation permits additional leeway for States
testimony/directors-remarks-at-pacific-council.html.
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242. Id. art. 51(5)(b).
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to justify collateral damage by allowing them to compare the collateral damage of
the specific attack to the military benefit in the context of the entire campaign.
The final step in assessing proportionality is to weigh the prospectively
determined collateral damage against the military advantage, to ensure the
expected loss of life and destruction of property will not be excessive to the gain.
The term excessive is vague and little State practice exists to readily determine the
exact meaning and scope of this term. Proportionality is evaluated on a case-bycase basis, requiring that a State must weigh the value of the target, the location of
the attack, the timing of the attack, the number of anticipated civilian casualties,
and the amount of damage anticipated to civilian objects, such as buildings,
bridges, hospitals and utilities, for each and every attack it executes.
When applying the proportionality analysis to the Mehsud attack, the issue is
whether the anticipated collateral damages, including the people in the house, other
civilians around the house, and the house itself, is excessive given the value of
eliminating Mehsud, as a leader of the Taliban and a high value military target.
The U.S. could potentially justify a greater number of civilian casualties for the
attack on Mehsud, as compared to a lower level combatant with a less prominent
role than Mehsud. As a prospective analysis, the U.S. must consider its anticipated
collateral damage for executing Mehsud, and it is irrelevant to retrospectively
evaluate the actual damage or military gain the U.S. achieved in fact. For example,
if the U.S. received reliable surveillance intelligence that only five civilians were
in Mehsud's house and the surrounding area rather than the eleven actually
present, the proportionality analysis would consider whether the killing of those
five individuals, and not the eleven present, is excessive to the military advantage
of terminating Mehsud.
Foreseeable risks must also be taken into account within the proportionality
analysis. 249 Potential errors or mistakes by the targeting State must be considered,
but again, only risks assessable prospectively. 250 If a missile is likely to misfire or
the blast radius could exceed the intended targeting area, thereby impacting
additional civilian lives or property, these foreseeable scenarios must also be
weighed against the expected military advantage. Upon executing an attack
however, perfection is not required, and unintended civilian casualties will not
render an attack disproportionate. 1
C. Distinction
252
The principle of distinction, as the "very heart and soul of the law of war,, 253
requires a State to distinguish between its legitimate military target and civilians.
Even if a target is necessary, the State must take all feasible steps to minimize
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254
Feasibility does not require perfection, but
damage to civilian life and objects.
rather that the person launching the attack takes appropriate measures to correctly
255
Distinction
identify the target and limit civilian casualties as far as possible.
a
is
considered
individual
an
1)
whether
issues:
encompasses three separate
civilian or combatant and may be legitimately targeted; 2) whether the weapon
employed adequately distinguishes between civilian and military targets; and, 3)
whether the execution of an attack actually distinguished civilian life and property
from that of a military nature.

Turning to the first consideration, distinction demands that States distinguish
between members of the armed forces and all others present who are entitled to
civilian status. 2 56 Civilians are generally afforded immunity from military
2 58
attacks.257 Civilian immunity is the primary purpose ofjus in bello and civilians
25 9
Civilians
maintain that immunity unless they directly participate in hostilities.
who join a terrorist organization and are responsible for planning and executing a
have a continuous combat function, and thus are
chain of terrorist attacks
260
targetable at any time.
The second issue within distinction encompasses the modes of military force,
primarily the weapons utilized. Certain weapons inherently violate the principle of
distinction because of their inability to distinguish between civilians and
combatants. In its advisory opinion, The Legality of Nuclear Weapons, the I.C.J.
acknowledged that weapons such as mines, incendiaries, and those of a chemical
or bacteriological nature inherently violate IHL, as recognized by conventional and
customary law.261
It may be argued that drones equipped with Hellfire missiles are inherently
indiscriminate based purely on the number of civilian casualties incurred from U.S.
drone attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, as compared to the reported
successful terrorist kills. 2 62 However, most agree that drones are precise weapons
systems, and do not inherently violate the principle of distinction. Predator and
Reaper drones have 24-hour surveillance capability, referred to as persistent stare
capability,2 63 and as Aaron Drake, Captain in the U.S. Air Force, Air National
Guard, points out, drone operators can gather a substantial amount of information
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about the targeting area, including the number of civilians present, and whether
combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities are present.2 4
Additionally, these drones are equipped with a laser designator for its Hellfire
missiles, permitting precise targeting.265
Moreover, the employment of Hellfire missiles in general, and specifically by
the U.S. against Mehsud and other terrorist leaders, may not violate the principle of
distinction. The Hellfire missile possesses an extremely precise blast radius,
ranging from ten to fifteen feet, and can be programmed for delay detonation.266
Thus, a Hellfire can precisely target a house and delay the explosion until after
fully penetrating the building, minimizing damage to surrounding people or
objects. Accordingly, attacks executed with Hellfire missiles launched by Predator
drones most likely do not inherently violate the principle of distinction.
Finally, as Drake correctly recognizes, potential misuses of weapons do not
render that entire class of weapons illegitimate. As he notes, "Commentary on
Article 36 of [Additional Protocol] I confirms this, providing that '[a] State is not
required to foresee or analyze all possible misuses of a weapon, for almost any
weapon can be misused in ways that would be prohibited.' 267 Therefore, even if
the U.S. were indiscriminately launching Hellfire missiles from drones, their
failure to comply with IHL would not automatically delegitimize the use of drones.
The third issue under distinction pertains to the actual execution of an attack.
Attacks are unlawful under the principle of distinction if they are directed
specifically against civilians or civilian objects or launched indiscriminately
without distinction between civilians and military targets.268 Additionally, once an
attack is launched, if a mistake is discovered and an object is found not to be a
military objective, then the attack must be immediately aborted.269 States must
employ greater caution when distinguishing between civilians and military targets
when the attack is launched from a further distance and a direct view of the object
is not available. 270 The requirement of distinction is likely the reason the U.S. and
other States utilize ground informants to confirm legitimate military targets for
Predator drone attacks.2 7 1 Ground informants often successfully prevent intended

264. Drake, supra note 18, at 653.
265. SINGER, supranote 35, at 33.
266. AGM-114 HELLFIRE MODULAR MISSILE SYSTEM (HMMS), Military, GlobalSecurity.Org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/agm- 114.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2011); see
Michael N. Schmitt, PrecisionAttack and InternationalHumanitarian Law, 87 Int'l R. Red Cross 445
(2005).
267. Drake, supranote 18, at 653.
268. DUFFY, supranote 37, at 228-29; Additional Protocol II, supra note 16, arts. 13, 51(2), 51(4).
269. Alston Report, supra note 35, 89.
270. PILLOUD, supra note 255, at art. 57, 2221.
271. The U.S. regularly utilizes ground informants to verify targets for drone attacks in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Yemen. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman & Adam Entous, CIA Plans Yemen Drone Strikes:
Covert Program Would Be Major Expansion of U.S. Efforts to Kill Members of al Qaeda, WALL ST. J.,
at
available
2011,
14,
June
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023038481045763840515726791 10.html.

2011

CLARIFYING THE LAW

attacks from violating distinction, as illustrated by the abortion of a U.S. drone
attack on six individuals suspected to be al Qaeda combatants planting roadside
bombs, which informants confirmed to actually be five children digging for
firewood.272
In analyzing the execution of the attack against Mehsud, it appears it most
likely complied with distinction. The attack was not purposefully launched at
civilians or civilian property without a military objective, because Mehsud had
continuous combatant status, making him a legitimate military objective.
Moreover, as discussed above, because a drone with 24-hour surveillance
capabilities executed the attack, the U.S. likely knew the expected number of
civilian losses and conducted a proportionality assessment, thereby not
indiscriminately killing those civilians.
VII. CONCLUSION
As illustrated throughout this article, the law relating to the use of force is
complex, contradictory, and highly contentious. Any use of force must fall under
one of the three basic legal paradigms: human rights, self-defense, or armed
conflict. Due to the lack of a comprehensive definition of terrorism and the failure
of the international community to adopt a binding instrument that specifically
governs acts of terrorism, States are required to justify their uses of force against
terrorists within the three existing bodies of law. Depending upon which legal
framework applies, the lethal drone campaigns perpetrated by the U.S. and other
States may be legal.
Additionally, it remains extremely controversial as to whether terrorism
triggers law enforcement methods governed by human rights or whether it
activates the right to use force in self-defense. Further, it is debated whether
terroristic activities can rise to the level of a non-international armed conflict,
allowing a State to operate underjus in bello principles. Thus, the legality of the
responses carried out by the U.S. and its allies against terrorists, and particularly
the use of weaponized drones, remains controversial. Accordingly, States should
attempt to clarify the law under which they are operating when responding to
terrorism. To improve accountability and transparency, States should notify the
Security Council not only of their use of force, but also as to which paradigm they
are operating within. This would prevent States, such as the U.S., from defending
its actions under multiple categories without giving any legal justifications for
doing so. In the end, under the current ad hoc approach to terrorism and the lack
of universal consensus as to definitions and parameters concerning the use of
force, a State can argue a myriad of reasons to justify any use of force against
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terrorists, with little fear of ramifications from the international community for
illegal uses of force.

